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Recent Developments

Hopkins v. State:
In-Court Voice Exemplar Given for Non-Testimonial Purposes may be Admissible
where the Exemplar is Relevant and Reliable
By Joseph H. D. Solomon

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a nontestimonial voice exemplar given by
the defendant at trial did not violate
the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against compelled self incrimination
Hopkins v. State, 352 Md. 146, 721
A.2d 231 (citing United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23
(1969». The court further held, in an
issue of first impression in Maryland,
that such in-court voice identification
evidence may be admissible where
such evidence is relevant and reliable.
On April 27, 1996, the
defendant, Marquis Hopkins
("Hopkins"), robbed Mr. and Mrs.
Franklin McQuay at gunpoint in a
parking lot. Id. at '150, 721 A.2d at
233. While placing the gun to Mr.
McQuay's head, Hopkins stated,
"Yo, check it out." Id. Additionally,
Hopkins made several threatening
statements and made his escape with
the couple's valuables. Id. Afterthe
robbery, Mrs. McQuay called the
police and gave a physical description
of Hopkins. Id. at 151, 721 A.2d at
233. A month later, Mrs. McQuay
identified Hopkins from a
photographic line-up, but indicated on
the back of the photo that she needed
to see him in person and hear him
speak to be certain of her
identification. Id.
At trial, Mrs. McQuay visually
identified Hopkins as the robber. Id.
The defense challenged the
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identification, and on re-direct
examination, the prosecution
requested the court to compel
Hopkins to stand and state, "Yo,
check it out." Id. at 152, 721 A.2d at
234. The defense objected, arguing
that the request was untimely. Id. The
trial court ruled that any lapse in time
affected the weight of the evidence,
not its admissibility, and therefore
allowed the voice exemplar. Id. at
153, 721 A.2d at 234. After hearing
the voice exemplar, Mrs. McQuay
reasserted her identification of
Hopkins. Id. She said Hopkins's
voice was distinguishable from that of
other African Americans because he
was "articulate." Id. The Baltimore
County Circuit Court subsequently
convicted Hopkins ofrobbery with a
deadly and dangerous weapon and
several other lesser offenses. Id. at
149, 721 A.2d at 233.
Hopkins appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland. Id.
at 154, 721 A.2d at 235. Although
the defense never made a Fifth
Amendment objection at trial, or
object to the characterization of
Hopkins' voice as "articulate," it
raised these issues on appeal. Id. The
court of special appeals exercised its
discretion to address the issues, and
affinned the conviction. Id The Court
of Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari on the same issues, and
upheld the ruling ofthe court ofspecial
appeals. Id.

The court of appeals began its
analysis by noting that the Fifth
Amendment prohibition against self
incrimination does not protect a
defendant from being compelled to
write or speak solely for identification
purposes. Id. (citing Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 764
(1966». The Supreme Court, in
United States v. Wade, held that
voice identifications compelled during
line-ups are admissible as evidence
ofan identifying characteristic, not as
testimonial evidence, and therefore
did not violate the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 155, 721 A.2d at 235 (citing
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218,222-23 (1969». Evenrequiring
a defendant to recite the words
spoken during the commission of a
crime was not considered testimonial
because the defendant's voice was
used as an identifying characteristic,
and not to disclose his knowledge of
facts. Id. The court analogized this
case to Vandergrift v. State, where
the court of special appeals held that
a court may order a defendant to
read a transcript aloud at trial. Id. at
156, 721 A.2d at 236 (citing
Vandergrift v. State, 82 Md. App.
617,639,573 A.2d 56,66 (1990».
In both Hopkins and Vandergrift,
the court determined that the voice
exemplar was not used as testimonial
evidence. Id.
Rejecting Hopkins' argument
that the voice exemplar should have
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been given prior to trial, the court
noted that since the voice exemplar's
prupose was for identification, it made
no difference that the trial court
compelled the exemplar at trial as
opposed to before trial. Id. (citing
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201,
210 (1988». This finding was
consistent with the court's prior
holding that requiring a suspect to
display physical characteristics to aid
identification did not cause a defendant
toincrhninatehimself Id at 157,721
A.2d at 236 (citing Dyson v. State,
238 Md. 398, 404, 209, A.2d 609,
619 (1965».
Hopkins' claimed that the
exemplar was unnecessary because
the witness physically identified him
prior to the voice exemplar, and it was
therefore testimonial in nature. Id.
(citing Doe, 487 U.S. at 210). The
court, however, noted that a
defendant's communications must
convey factual information to be
considered testimonial. Id.
Furthermore, the court reasoned, the
exemplar's purpose was not to elicit
testimonial evidence, but rather to
bolster the witness's testimony
because the defense challenged the
physical identification. Id.
After determining that the voice
exemplar did not violate the Fifth
Amendment, the court next addressed
the admissibility ofsuch evidence. The
court found that it is within the trial
judge's discretion to admit the voice
exemplar. Id. at 158, 721 A.2d at
23 7 (citing Vandergrift, 82 Md. App.
at 639, 573 A.2dat66 (1990». The
decision to admit the voice exemplar
may be reversed only where there was
an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing

Robinson v. State, 348 Md. 104,
121, 702 A.2d 741, 749 (1997».
Because the court had never
before addressed when trial courts
could admit in-court voice
identification evidence, it looked to
other jurisdictions for guidance. In
State v. Newman, the Supreme Court
ofNebraska held that non-testimonial
voice exemplars were not
automatically admissible, and may only
be introduced at trial if such evidence
is relevant and reliable. Id. at 159,
721 A.2d at 238 (citing State v.
Newman, 548 N.W.2d 739, 752
(Neb. 1996». InPeoplev. Scarola,
the court similarly held that the test of
whether a voice exemplar is
admissible depends on whether it is
relevant and reliable. Id. (citing
People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 769,
770 (1988». Afterreviewing case
law from other jurisdictions, the court
examined evidentiary rules for the
admissibility ofthe voice exemplar.
Maryland Rule 5-401 reads, in
pertinent part, states that evidence is
"relevant if it tends to make the
existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of
the action more or less probable." Id.
(citing MD. R. EVID. 5-401).
Maryland Rule 5-403 also provides
that relevant "evidence [may] be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial affect." Id. The
determination ofwhether the probative
value ofan in-courtvoice identification
is substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect is also within the trial
court's discretion. Id (citing People
v. Davis, 502 N.E.2d 731 (1987».
Because relevance and reliability are

separate issues, as a threshold matter,
the court noted that relevance should
be determined first. Id. at 160, 721
A.2d at 238.
In Hopkins, the court found the
exemplar relevant because the
defense challenged the witness's
visual identification of Hopkins. Id.
at 163, 721 A.2d at 239. The court
recognized the potential prejudicial
effect of requiring a defendant to utter
the same words a suspect used while
committing a crime, however, the
court did not believe the exemplar's
prejudicial value substantially
outweighed its probative value. Id at
163-64,721 A.2d at 239-40. (citing
Davis, 502 N.E.2d at 783 (1987».
After finding the exemplar
relevant in this case, the court next
addressed its reliability. Id. at 159,
721 A.2d at 238. In so doing, the
court adopted the test set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Neil
v. Biggers. Id at 160, 721 A.2d at
238 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.

188,199(1972». UndertheBiggers
test, factors for courts to consider
when determining the reliability of
identification evidence include:
(1) the ability of the witness to
hear the assailant speak, (2) the
witness's degree ofattention, (3)
the accuracy of any prior
identifications that the witness
made, (4) the period of time
between the incident and the
identification, and (5) how certain
the witness was in making the
identification
Id. (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199).
In employing the Biggers test, the
court followed the two- pronged test
used by other jurisdictions. Id. First,
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the exemplar was suggeStive, the court
examines the totality ofcirctunStances
to determine if the identification was
reliable enough to avoid
misidentification. Id. at 161, 721
A.2d at 238 (citing Rodriguez v.
Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 556 (7th Cir.
1995». The second prong requires
the application ofthe Biggers factors.
Id.
Hopkins argued the exemplar
was unreliable and it was suggestive
because he was the only African
American in the courtroom. Id. at
165,721 A.2dat240. Thecourtheld
that the prior visual identifications
made the exemplar identification
reliable. Id. The court dismissed the
suggestiveness issue, citing Webster
v. State, which held that a suggestive
identification was admissible where it
was reliable. Id. at 165-66, 721 A.2d
at 240-41 (citing Webster v. State,
299 Md. 581,601,474 A.2d 1305,
1315 (1984». Having found the
exemplar "sufficiently reliable under
the totality of circumstances," the
court of appeals applied the Biggers
factors in Hopkins, and found the
facts satisfied its requirements. Id. at
164-65, 721 A.2d at 240.
Relying upon the relevancy and
reliability test set forth in Biggers, the
court held the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting the
exemplar into evidence. With this
holding, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has crept its way to the edge
of a very slippery slope upon which it
must be cognizant not to cross, for
fear of violating a defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self
incrimination by compelling him to
essentially reenact the crime.
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